We study the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) yielded by imperfect competition under product differentiation. When demand is linear, if prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms can be observed, PWL is arbitrary in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. If in addition, the elasticity of demand (resp. cross elasticity of demand) is known, we can calculate PWL in Cournot (resp. Bertrand) equilibrium. When demand is isoelastic and there are many firms, PWL can be computed from prices, outputs, costs and the number of .rms. In all these cases we find that price-marginal cost margins and demand elasticities may influence PWL in a counterintuitive way. We also provide conditions under which PWL increases or decreases with concentration.
Introduction
One of the most robust …ndings of the Industrial Organization is that, very often, market equilibrium yields ine¢ cient allocations. But, how large are these ine¢ ciencies? This topic has inspired considerable empirical literature, starting with the seminal paper by Harberger (1954) . In contrast, theoretical literature is scarce and focuses on the case of homogeneous products. In this case, it is well known that the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) in a Cournot Equilibrium when demand and costs are linear and …rms are identical is 1 (1+n) 2 where n is the number of …rms. McHardy (2000) showed that when demand is quadratic, welfare losses can be 30% larger than in the linear model. Anderson and Renault (2003) calculated PWL for a more general class of demand functions. Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) showed that if average costs are not increasing and the inverse demand function is concave, PWL is less than In this paper we analyze PWL in two models of imperfect competition with heterogeneous products and a representative consumer with quasi-linear preferences: A model with linear demand functions, Dixit (1979) , Singh and Vives (1984) , and a model with isoelastic demand functions, Spence (1976) . Firms produce under constant average costs. Our …rst step is to …nd PWL as a function of the fundamentals, i.e. parameters in demand and cost functions. Generally, these parameters cannot be observed so our second step is to obtain PWL as a function of observable variables like price, output, number of …rms, etc. When this is not possible, we will introduce items that might be estimated, like the elasticity of demand. The goal of our analysis is to study the impact of observable variables on PWL. Even though PWL can be calculated from data case by case, our approach allows the theoretical factors explaining PWL to be pinpointed.
We …rst consider the model with linear demand. Assume that …rms and demand functions are identical. We show that, given an observation of a price, output, marginal cost and number of …rms, there are parameters of the demand function that convert this observation in a Cournot or a Bertrand equilibrium such that PWL is arbitrary (Propositions 1 and 2). This shows that PWL is unrelated to the di¤erences among pro…t rates, contrary to Harberger's dictum: "The di¤erences among these pro…t rates, as between industries, give a broad indication of the extent of resource malallocation" (op. cit. p. 79). In our model all …rms have the same rate of return on capital but PWL can be very high, especially if goods are complements. It seems that Harberger's procedure picks up welfare losses stemming from the failure of markets to equalize pro…t rates and not welfare losses from oligopolistic misallocation, a related but di¤erent issue.
Next we show that if the elasticity of demand can be estimated, PWL in a Cournot equilibrium can be computed from observables (Proposition 3). The elasticity of demand is of no help in the case of a Bertrand equilibrium because it can be obtained from observables and the …rst order condition of pro…t maximization. We show that if the cross elasticity of demand can be estimated, PWL can be computed from observations (Proposition 5). Finally we study how PWL depends on these variables (Propositions 4 and 6). Some results are what we expected but others are not: when goods are substitutes, PWL is decreasing on the price-marginal cost margins (often referred to as the "monopoly index", Lerner, 1934) in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. 1 And PWL increases with the elasticity of demand in a Bertrand equilibrium. Why is this so? Consider two markets, A and B, and let the price-marginal cost margin be larger in A than in B. This means that the triangle that represents welfare losses is larger in A than in B. However, realized welfare is also larger in A than in B because the demand function in A is above the demand function in B. A priori, there is no good reason to expect that one e¤ect is larger than the other. In fact, as we noticed before, when costs and demand are linear and …rms are identical, these two e¤ects cancel each other out and PWL only depends on the number of …rms. 2 The same argument goes for demand 1 This was noticed by Formby and Leyson (1982) in the case of monopoly. 2 In other words, price-marginal cost margins do not control for the size of demand. Thus, a high margin might indicate either that demand is very large and …rms are having a good time-even if they are very competitive-or that …rms are "exploiting" consumers and destroying a large part of the surplus. This is true even if actual production is known because it is a poor indicator of e¢ cient production.
3 elasticity: a larger demand elasticity means less welfare losses and less realized welfare so the total e¤ect is ambiguous.
Next we introduce heterogeneity in demand and costs. We provide generalizations of our previous results on how to calculate PWL. Unfortunately, the resulting formulae are pretty messy so we relegate them to an Appendix. We focus on the study of the relationship between concentration and welfare losses. Some papers found that the Hirschman-Her…ndahl (H) index of concentration is not a good measure of welfare losses:
in Daughety (1990) because more concentration may be associated with a larger output in a leader-follower equilibrium; in Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Cable et al. (1994) and Corchón (2008) because …rms may be of di¤erent sizes. 3 This contrast with the 1992
Merger Guidelines issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) where H is considered a reasonable measure of welfare losses, Coate (2005) . We show that when it is optimal to allow all …rms to produce and goods are substitutes, PWL increases with H in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria (Proposition 7). This case arises when goods are poor substitutes. We also show that when it is optimal to allow only one …rm to produce, PWL decreases with H. This is what happened in the papers quoted above where products are perfect substitutes. Thus concentration is bad (resp. good) for welfare when goods are poor (resp. good) substitutes. This is because e¢ cient production must balance cost savings-which go in the direction of concentrating production in the most e¢ cient …rms-with consumer satisfaction where the latter may require considerable diversi…cation of production. Where the last e¤ect is not very large (i.e. when products are close substitutes) cost savings drives e¢ ciency and thus concentration does not harm e¢ ciency. But when products are poor substitutes e¢ cient production requires output dispersion and concentration is harmful. We also show that at the value of H considered by the FTC as a threshold for a concentrated industry, PWL is large in a Cournot equilibrium but may be small in a Bertrand equilibrium.
In Section 3 we assume that the representative consumer has preferences over differentiated goods representable by a CES utility function. We also assume that there is a large number of identical …rms. This model (Spence, 1976) and its variants (see, 3 The point that minor …rms may be harmful for welfare was …rst made by Lahiri and Ono (1988) . 4 e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) are popular in the …elds of monopolistic competition, international trade, geography and economics, etc. But contrary to these models, we assume that the number of …rms is exogenous. The reason for this is that endogenizing the number of …rms needs …xed costs and the latter may produce large PWL (Corchón, 2008) . Since in this paper we want to focus on PWL produced by product heterogeneity alone we assume that the number of …rms is given. We show that PWL tends to zero when demand elasticity tends to in…nity, but PWL tends to one when the degree of homogeneity of the CES function tends to one (Proposition 8). This quali…es a conjecture of Stigler (1949) : "...the predictions of this standard model of imperfect competition di¤er only in unimportant respects from those of the theory of competition because the underlying conditions will usually be accompanied by very high demand elasticities for the individual …rms". In this model, a high elasticity of demand makes PWL small, but given any elasticity of demand, we can obtain PWL as close to one as we wish.
Next, we show that PWL can be recovered from the observation of a price, an output, a marginal cost and the number of …rms (Proposition 9). However a low price-marginal cost margin does not guarantee that PWL is small: even if price tends to the marginal cost, when the number of …rms is su¢ ciently large, PWL may exceed those in the linear model under monopoly. Moreover, when the number of …rms tends to in…nity, PWL is decreasing in the price-marginal cost margin (Proposition 10). Again, this is another case where price-marginal cost margins and welfare losses are not related in the way we previously thought.
Summing up, we have three main conclusions. First, our main message is positive: obtaining PWL from data is possible in two well-known models of imperfect competition.
Second, the impact of rates of returns, price-marginal cost margins or the elasticity of demand on PWL, is not always what we thought to be. Finally, we provide an explanation of the role of the H index on PWL.
The Linear Model
In this section we assume that inverse demand is linear. In the …rst subsection we assume that all …rms are identical which allows for clean formulae of welfare losses. In the second subsection we study the case where costs and intercepts of inverse demands are di¤erent among …rms. The second part o¤ers formulae for PWL that are used to discuss the role of concentration in oligopolistic markets.
The Symmetric Case
The market is composed of n …rms. The output (resp. price) of …rm i is denoted by x i (resp. p i ). Firms are identical with a cost function cx i . There is a representative consumer with a quadratic utility function. The consumer surplus is
Under these assumptions, U ( ) is concave. FOC of utility maximization yield
x j ; i = 1; 2; :::; n.
Goods are substitutes (resp. complements) i¤ > 0 (resp. < 0). The ratio represents the degree of product di¤erentiation: if = 0 products are independent, and if = they are perfect substitutes.
De…nition 1.
A linear market is a list f ; ; ; c; ng with > c, > maxf0; ; (n 1)g and n 2 N.
Social welfare is de…ned as
The social optimum is a list of outputs that maximize social welfare. It is easy to see that optimal outputs are all identical-denoted by x o i -and equal to
Social welfare in the optimum is
Now we are ready to de…ne our equilibrium concepts.
De…nition 2.
A Cournot equilibrium in a linear market is a list of outputs (x c 1 ; x c 2 ; :::; x c n ) such that for each i, x c i maximizes
From the FOC of pro…t maximization we obtain that
; i = 1; 2; :::; n:
In order to de…ne a Bertrand equilibrium we need to invert the system (2.1). Adding up these equations from 1 to n we get
; which plugged into (2.1) yields
, or
where p i is a list of all prices minus p i . Notice that given our assumptions on and , @x i @p j < 0 i¤ < 0. Now we can de…ne a Bertrand equilibrium.
De…nition 3. A Bertrand equilibrium in a linear market is a list of prices
Let W c be social welfare evaluated at the Cournot equilibrium. Let us de…ne the percentage of welfare losses in a Cournot equilibrium as 
Then,
Notice that PWL is decreasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation, . Thus, minimal PWL is
2 and occurs for the maximal value of ; which is one, i.e. when products are perfect substitutes. When products are substitutes, maximal PWL occurs for the minimal value of which is zero, and PWL is :25: When products are complements,
Let P W L b be the percentage of welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium. Then, Lemma 2. In a linear market the percentage of welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium is
Proof: From (2.7) we obtain that all …rms produce the same output, x b i , namely
Social welfare in a Bertrand equilibrium is
4 When goods are complements, PWL increases with n. This is because there is insu¢ cient coordination among …rms and the greater the number of …rms, the greater the coordination problem.
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Thus,
Note that PWL is decreasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation . Thus, minimal PWL is zero and occurs when = , i.e. when products are perfect substitutes. When products are substitutes, maximal PWL occurs for = 0, namely :25: When products are complements, maximal PWL is
so in the remainder of the section we will assume that n > 1.
We are interested in the PWL yielded by imperfectly competitive markets, conditional on the values taken by certain variables that can be observed, namely market prices, outputs, marginal cost and number of …rms. We assume that marginal cost is observable because under constant returns, the marginal cost equals the average variable cost which, in principle, can be observed (wages, raw materials, etc.). Formally: De…nition 4. An observation is a list fp; x i ; c; ng where p is market price, x i is output of …rm i, c (< p) is the marginal cost and n is number of …rms.
Let us relate PWL with observable variables. First we consider the Cournot equilibrium. Proposition 1. Given an observation fp; x i ; c; ng and a number v 2 (
there is a linear market f ; ; ; c; ng such that (x i ; x i ; :::; x i ) is a Cournot equilibrium for this
Clearly, > c and > maxf0; ;
2 and v <1. We easily see that the linear market f ; ; ; c; ng yields an equilibrium where x c i = x i , i = 1; 2; :::; n, p = x i (n 1)x i and P W L c = v, so the proof is complete.
Now we turn to the case of the Bertrand equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Given an observation fp; x i ; c; ng and a number v 2 0; n n+1 2 there is a linear market f ; ; ; c; ng such that (p; p; :::; p) is a Bertrand equilibrium for this market, x i = x b i (p; p i ) where p i is a list of n 1 identical p, and P W L b = v.
It is easy to check that 0 < c < and > maxf0; ; (n 1)g. The linear market f ; ; ; c; ng yields a Bertrand equilibrium where
Propositions 1 and 2 show that observable variables put very few restrictions on PWL. In particular, neither price-marginal cost margins nor pro…t rates have any relationship with PWL. Let us look for restrictions that can take a bite out of PWL. 5 Suppose that the demand elasticity, denoted by ", is observable. From (2.6)
Let us introduce a new piece of notation, namely T " p c p . Now we have the following result. Proposition 3. Given an observation fp; x i ; c; n; "g such that T " p c p 1 and the information that goods are substitutes or complements, there is a linear market f ; ; ; c; ng such that (x i ; x i ; :::; x i ) is a Cournot equilibrium for this market, p =
with sign "+" (resp. sign "-") corresponding to the case of substitutes (resp. complements).
Proof : Let us consider the case of substitutes …rst. Let
Clearly, > 0. We need to show that 0 < < 1 and > c. Note that for T 1 the square root is de…ned in real numbers and
because if not, we would have n 2 T < (n 2) 2 T, which is impossible. Then the condition
that always holds for T 2 [1; 1). The condition > c amounts to (T 1) (n 2) + r
. Now we need to prove that the linear market f ; ; ; c; ng yields a Cournot equilibrium where
11 So we have shown in the case of substitutes that there exists a linear market f ; ; ; c; ng that yields a Cournot equilibrium where x c i = x i and p = x i (n 1) x i . Then it is straightforward to …nd P W L c by plugging the values of and in (2.9).
Now we consider the case of complements. Let
We need to show that 1 n 1 < < 0 and > c. The former condition amounts to
that holds for T 2 [1; 1). The latter condition amounts to T (n + 2) (n 2) r
Let us show now that the linear market f ; ; ; c; ng yields a Cournot equilibrium where
So we have proved in the case of complements that there exists a linear market f ; ; ; c; ng that yields a Cournot equilibrium where x c i = x i and p = x i (n 1) x i . Then it is straightforward to …nd P W L c by plugging the values of and in (2.9).
According to Proposition 3 we can calculate PWL in a Cournot equilibrium in (2.13) from three variables-the number of …rms, the elasticity of demand and the pricemarginal cost ratio-plus the information that goods are complements or substitutes which gives us the sign of . Let us now study how PWL depends on n and T.
Proposition 4. When goods are substitutes (resp. complements), P W L c is decreasing (resp. increasing) in n, the elasticity of demand and the price-marginal costs margins.
Proof : First, we consider the case of substitutes, that is =
2 )
so an increase in the number of …rms decreases P W L c , which is what intuition suggests.
To continue, we compute
which is positive, so P W L c decreases with T when goods are substitutes.
Second, we study the case of complements, that is = (T 1)(n 2)
Therefore, when goods are complements P W L c is increasing in the number of …rms n.
Next, we calculate @ @T which amounts to
which is negative, so P W L c increases with T.
In Proposition 4 the sign of the e¤ect of the number of …rms and demand elasticity is what we expected: more competition-i.e. the higher n or "-is good (resp. bad) when goods are substitutes (complements). However the e¤ect of price-marginal cost margins runs counter to our intuition. As we remarked in the introduction this is because this margin a¤ects both welfare losses and realized welfare.
We now consider the Bertrand equilibrium. In this case, FOC condition of pro…t maximization can be written as p i = "(p i c). Thus the observation of " does not add any new information once p i and c are observed. A way out of this problem is provided if the cross elasticity of demand
, denoted by , is observable, as shown next.
Proposition 5. Given an observation fp; x i ; c; n; g such that p p c > maxf (n 1); g, there is a linear market f ; ; ; c; ng such that (p; p; :::; p) is a Bertrand equilibrium for this market,
where p i is a list of n 1 identical p, and
(2.14)
It is easy to prove that > c and > max f0; ; (n 1)g for 
Thus given an observation fp; x i ; c; n; g such that Proposition 6. When goods are substitutes (resp. complements) P W L b is decreasing (resp. increasing) in the number of …rms and price-marginal cost margins and it is increasing (resp. decreasing) in the elasticity of demand. P W L b is decreasing in the cross elasticity of demand.
Proof: From (2.14) we get
(n 1))
From these formulae the proposition follows.
Proposition 6 con…rms our intuitions about the role of the number of …rms and the cross elasticity of demand on welfare losses, namely that when goods are substitutes (resp. complements) an increase in the number of …rms decreases (resp. increases) PWL and an increase in the cross elasticity of demand decreases PWL both for substitutes and for complements. But, again, the impact of the price-marginal cost margin goes contrary to what intuition suggests: It is negative (resp. positive) for substitutes (resp. complements). It is also notable that demand elasticity a¤ects PWL in a counterintuitive way. Again we have to bear in mind that demand elasticity a¤ects both welfare losses and realized welfare.
Heterogeneous Firms
We extend the model presented before to the case where …rms are heterogeneous on two counts. On the one hand marginal costs, denoted by c i for …rm i, may be di¤erent across …rms. On the other hand the parameter , denoted by i for …rm i, may be di¤erent across …rms. 6 Assume i > c i for all i: The consumer surplus is now
The restrictions below guarantee that the outputs of all …rms are positive in Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
c i ; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (2.15) 
Social welfare reads now
Evaluating social welfare in the optimum is not straightforward because it depends on the number of active …rms in the optimum. For the time being, let us assume that it is optimal that m …rms are active. Then optimal outputs-denoted by x o i -are equal to and aggregate output in the optimum-denoted by x o -is equal to
We now …nd the optimal number of …rms m.
Algorithm to de…ne an optimal number of …rms m. Let us rank …rms according to the value of i c i . Without loss of generality assume that v c v v+1 c v+1 , v = 1; 2; :::; n 1. Clearly if …rm v produces a positive output in the optimum, …rms v 1; v 2; etc. also produce a positive output in the optimum. Suppose that it is optimal that …rms 1 to k 1 produce a positive output. Now evaluate @W @x k in (2.17) at x k = 0 and x j = x o j , j = 1; :::; k 1 according to (2.18), and we obtain that
This algorithm needs knowledge of all the parameters de…ning a market. In an
Appendix we show that all these parameters can be recovered from market data and demand elasticities in a way identical to what we did in Propositions 3 and 5. We will focus on two particular cases. First, when ( 2 c 2 )
( 1 c 1 ), only …rm 1 will produce a positive output in the optimum since from (2.18) and (2.20), In this framework, a Cournot equilibrium is a list of outputs (x c 1 ; x c 2 ; :::; x c n ) such that for each i, x c i maximizes
and aggregate output at the Cournot equilibrium reads
In order to compute a Bertrand equilibrium we …rst write the demand for …rm i:
A Bertrand equilibrium is a list (p b 1 ; p b 2 ; :::; p b n ) such that for all i p b i maximizes
and aggregate output at the Bertrand equilibrium reads
Next, we link PWL with the Hirschman-Her…ndahl index of concentration. Let s j i be the market share of …rm i in a Cournot equilibrium (j = c), a Bertrand equilibrium (j = b) or in the optimum (j = o). We de…ne the Hirschman-Her…ndahl index of concentration in a Cournot equilibrium or a Bertrand equilibrium as H j P n i=1 (s j i ) 2 , j = c; b, and in the optimum as
Lemma 3. When …rms are heterogeneous, the percentage of welfare losses in a Cournot equilibrium is
Proof: Let W c be social welfare evaluated at the Cournot equilibrium that reads
Let us analyze (2.23) term by term.
Therefore,
Using the de…nition of H o ; social welfare in the optimum is
Plugging the values of W c and W o in P W L c we obtain
and plugging in the values of x c and x o we obtain (2.22).
Note that P W L c here depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation , the number of active …rms in the optimum m, the sum of the market shares of the m largest …rms P m i=1 s c i and the Hirschman-Her…ndahl indices of concentration evaluated at the Cournot equilibrium and in the optimum, H c and H o . When m = 1, we have that
which is decreasing in H c . In the polar case where m = n-i.e. the number of active …rms is the same in the optimum and in a Cournot equilibrium-after lengthy calculations we arrive to the following:
If all …rms are identical,
, that is what we found in Lemma 1. Notice that H c and are less than one, so for reasonable values of n it makes sense to evaluate (2.24) as if n were a large number. In this case (2.24) simpli…es to
which is negative for 2 (0; H c ) ) and positive for 2 (
. So the minimum of P W L c (m = n; n large) occurs at = 1 4H c 2(1 H c ) : When H c = 0:18, which the FTC considers the threshold for a concentrated industry, the minimal P W L c is 0.241967 which is a large lower bound. Now we consider welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium.
Lemma 4. In a Bertrand equilibrium with heterogeneous …rms
Proof: Social welfare in a Bertrand equilibrium, denoted by W b reads,
Let P W L b be the percentage of welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium.
So, plugging in the values of x b and x o ; we obtain the formula above.
Thus, P W L b depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation , the number of active …rms in the optimum m and in a Bertrand equilibrium n, the sum of the market shares of m largest …rms P m i=1 s b i and the Hirschman-Her…ndahl indices of concentration H b and H o evaluated, respectively, in a Bertrand equilibrium and in the optimum.
As before let us consider two special cases. First, when in the optimum only …rm 1 is used by the planner. Then, m = 1 and Second, when the number of active …rms is the same in the optimum and in a
Bertrand equilibrium, after lengthy calculations, we obtain that
Finally, when n is large, (2.26) simpli…es to
which is decreasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation . Its maximal value is 0.25 
A Model of a Large Group
In this section we consider that the market for a di¤erentiated good is supplied by a large number of …rms. You may think of goods like restaurants, wine, beer, etc. We will not consider entry and …xed costs because as it was shown in Corchón (2008) , entry and …xed costs might produce a very high PWL. In this paper we want to study the impact of product di¤erentiation alone on PWL so we discard both …xed costs and entry that are likely to bias our estimates of PWL. As we will see this model is capable of yielding a very high PWL. The model can be interpreted as a monopolistic competition model in which the long-run aspects are not considered. In this framework, the relative size of …rms is not an important issue so we will assume that all …rms are identical. Also, for convenience, we will assume that …rms compete in quantities.
The consumer surplus reads
p i x i ; ; r 2 (0; 1), see Spence (1976) . The inverse demand function of …rm i is
De…nition 5. A CES Market is a list f ; r; c; ng with ; r 2 (0; 1), c > 0, and n 2 N.
Pro…t function for …rm i is
Because there is a high number of …rms, each …rm takes P n i=1 x i as given. The elasticity of demand, denoted by , is de…ned as the inverse of the elasticity of inverse demand, namely
Thus when ! 1 the elasticity of demand becomes in…nite. Now we have the following preliminary result.
Lemma 5. In a CES market
Proof: First order condition of pro…t maximization for …rm i is:
Left-hand side of (3.3) is decreasing in x i so second order condition holds. In a symmetric equilibrium where all …rms produce the same output, denoted by x i , we have that: 
:
In the optimal allocation price equals marginal cost and so, where x o i and W o stand for output and social welfare in the optimum. W o is increasing in n, so in the full optimum the planner would choose a number of …rms equal to n.
Consequently, the percentage of welfare losses is:
At …rst glance it is surprising that P W L s does not depend on the number of …rms n. However, we have assumed that the number of …rms is great. Thus, (3.2) can be understood as the limit formula when n is large. The following properties of P W L s are easily proved:
iii) P W L s is increasing in r.
The explanation of ii) is that when is close to one (resp. zero), product is close to being homogeneous (resp. very di¤erentiated), and welfare losses are small (resp. large), see (3.1). The explanation of iii) is that when r increases (resp. decreases) the gap between the optimal and the equilibrium output increases (resp. decreases) too, see (3.4) and (3.5). It follows from ii) and iv) that it is possible to have a market where the elasticity of demand is close to in…nity (i.e. close to 1) and PWL is as close to 1 as we wish. 7 In brief, elasticity of demand is only a partial measure of PWL in this model.
Let us relate P W L s with observable variables as de…ned in De…nition 4 in the previous section. Notice that the …rst order conditions of pro…t maximization imply that = p p c so in this framework, as in the Bertrand case in the previous section, knowledge of the elasticity of demand is of no help. We will assume that c(ln n + ln p) < p ln n; that will ensure that r < 1.
In our construction, the function P roductLog (t) will play a prominent role. This function, called the Lambert's W-function, gives the solution for w in t = we w and has the following properties: 8 i) P roductLog (t) 2 R for t 2 1 e ; 1 ;
iii) lim t!1 P roductLog (t) = 1;
vi) e aP roductLog(t) (P roductLog (t)) a = t a .
Now we have our main result in this section: 
Conclusion
In this paper we studied the relationship of observable variables with welfare losses, taking the behavior of …rms as given 10 . The models presented in this paper have been selected by their impact in the profession. 11 The main message of this paper is positive in the sense that this is a feasible endeavor in the models considered in this paper.
We also have uncovered several facts that contradict our intuition about how rates of returns, demand elasticities or price-marginal cost margins a¤ect welfare losses. We remark that we are not against the use of price-marginal cost margins or elasticities as indicators of welfare losses (such variables are widely used in issues like mergers, detection of cartelized behavior, predation or abusive practices). Our point is that such use must take into account the actual role played by these variables. 
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We end this paper by giving some hints on how data and elasticities may help us to discriminate among these models. The clearest case is a Bertrand equilibrium.
A necessary condition of this equilibrium to be supported by the data is that for all i, with sigh "+" (resp. "-") corresponding to the case of substitutes (resp. complements), such that (x 1 ; :::; x n ) is a Cournot equilibrium for this market, p i = i x i P j6 =i x j ; i = 1; :::; n, and P W L c is given by (2.22), where s c i =
m is found with the algorithm to de…ne an optimal number of …rms, and
where x o i is given by (2.18). which is positive for T 1 and n 2. Therefore, i > c i . It is straightforward to show that the linear market f 1 ; :::; n ; ; ; c 1 ; :::; c n ; ng yields a Cournot equilibrium where (x c 1 ; :::; x c n ) = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) and p i = i x i P j6 =i x j ; i = 1; :::; n (the proof is analogous to the one of Proposition 3). Now we …nd P W L c by plugging the values of 1 ; :::; n ; and in (2.22).
Let us consider the case of complements. Let 
See the proof of Proposition 3 for the checkup of the condition 1 n 1 < < 0. The condition i > c i holds due to the condition
2 ) (T 1)(n 2) . By analogy with the symmetric case we can show that the linear market f 1 ; :::; n ; ; ; c 1 ; :::; c n ; ng yields a Cournot equilibrium where (x c 1 ; :::; x c n ) = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) and p i = i x i P j6 =i x j ; i = 1; :::; n (see the proof of Proposition 3 for details). Then it is straightforward to …nd P W L c by plugging the values of 1 ; :::; n ; and in (2.22).
